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This paper examines the equilibrium provision of a public good if the private monetary
contributions of identical agents are (im)pure complements. To reconcile complementarity in
contributions with the apparent substitutability of monetary payments, we assume a setup
with multiple inputs into a complementary production function. This paper proves the
uniqueness and symmetry of the equilibrium for any impure complementarity if each agent is
permitted to contribute to any input; in the equilibrium, contributions are strategic substitutes.
Only pure complementarity exhibits multiple equilibria, where contributions are either
strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
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This paper revisits the strategic eﬀects of complementarities between pri-
vate contributions to a public good. If money is legal tender, payments are,
by deﬁnition, pure substitutes, so there must be a transformation prevent-
ing the contributions of diﬀerent agents from being pure substitutes. One
interpretation of the transformation is a production function exhibiting com-
plementarity between multiple inputs.
With multiple inputs, one can examine a class of games where the strategy
set of each agent entails the vectors of contributions to all inputs. This
setting has a tradition in the literature on in-kind transfers to weaker- and
weakest-link public goods (Sandler, Vicary 2001; Vicary, Sandler 2002). In-
kind subsidies to non-domestic inputs are indeed observed, in particular for
strong complementarities (e.g., smallpox has been eradicated by ﬁnancing
organised by the WHO, see Barrett 2003).
Extending the strategy space of an agent implies that his or her contri-
bution to an input has two diﬀerent functions: it serves as i) an (im)pure
complement to contributions to other inputs, and as ii) a pure substitute to
contributions to the same input. This has interesting strategic consequences.
In this paper, I compare these eﬀects with Cornes (1993) who extended
Bergstr¨ om’s et al. (1992) seminal proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium in a symmetric population on impurely complementary aggregations.
In the class of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregations,
Cornes proved that the equilibrium is not only unique, but also identical ir-
respective of complementarity. This paper follows up in demonstrating that
uniqueness rests predominantly on the impureness of complementarity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the standard setup with
a normal private good and a normal public good, imposing the CES aggrega-
tion of inputs into the public good. Section 3 examines impure complements
(weaker-link aggregations): It proves the unique Nash equilibrium but dis-
proves the invariance of the equilibrium to the type of aggregation. This
equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium in Cornes (1993), where con-
tributions are restricted into a single input. Section 4 examines the pure
complements (the weakest-link aggregation): It yields a multiple equilibria,
where contributions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
In addition, it explores two eﬀects of in-kind transfers: on one hand, some
Pareto-dominant equilibria disappear, and, on the other hand, a new distri-
butional conﬂict emerges. Section 5 concludes this paper.
12. Assumptions
We have n ∈ N identical individuals endowed with suﬃciently large money
income y > 0, and m ∈ N inputs into a public good. The individual i ∈
{1,...,n} contributes to an input j ∈ {1,...,m} an amount gi
j ∈ R+, where













Like in Cornes (1993), we restrict attention to complementarities, i.e.
ψ < 1. Pure substitutes corresponding to ψ = 1 are strategically trivial, and
better-shot aggregations with ψ > 1 are strategically completely diﬀerent.
Impure complements are −∞ < ψ < 1, and pure complements ψ = −∞.
The individual’s budget constraint is ci +
P
j gi
j ≤ y, where ci ≥ 0 is private
consumption, and the utility function is ui = Ui(ci,G). Both private and
public goods are normal goods. Hence, once we introduce the marginal rate











Let the marginal product of the input j be Gj, Gj ≡ ∂G(·)/∂gj, and the










For impure complements, the marginal rate of transformation is a contin-
uous function over the amounts of inputs, Tj,k ∈ R+. For pure complements,
the situation is diﬀerent: Tj,k = 0 if gj > gk, Tj,k = ∞ if gj < gk, or Tj,k is
undeﬁned.
3. Impure complements
Since for impure complements the marginal rate of transformation Tj,k is
continuous in gj × gk, we may expect that the usual interior condition of
optimal production holds with equality. This is captured in Lemma 1.
2Lemma 1 For impure complements, Tj,k = pj/pk holds ∀j,k ∈ {1,...,m}.
Proof By contradiction. First, we eliminate G = 0 on the basis of the
normality of the public good. Now, it is easy to ﬁnd that ∀j : gj > 0.
If not, and gk = 0 and gj > 0 exist, then this must be a corner implying
Tj,k ≥ pj/pk (all individuals have re-optimised from k-th toward j-th input).
Yet, imposing gk into Equation 2 (2) yields Tj,k = (gk/gj)
1−ψ = 0. In total,
Tj,k ≥ pj/pk > 0 = Tj,k, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 1 helps to identify that the unique equilibrium is symmetric in
both private and public consumption, and the only arbitrary variable is the
vector of divisions of costs across individuals.
Proposition 1 For impure complements, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric
and unique, and Si = Gi/pj,∀i ∈ {1,...,n},j ∈ {1,...,m}.
Proof For all individuals, the normality of a private good implies ci > 0.
The normality of the public good yields G > 0, hence there must be an
individual i who contributes to at least one input. From Lemma 1, the
contributor is in an equilibrium that is indiﬀerent between the inputs he
or she pays. This implies that for the optimising contributor, the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption equals the
marginal rates of transformation between all inputs and the private good,
Si = G1/p1 = ··· = Gm/pm.
The next step is to also prove this condition for any non-contributor
l. If not and Sl < Gj/pj, then the non-contributor l improves individual
welfare by increasing gl
j. If Sl > Gj/pj, then re-optimisation is not feasible
(gl
j = 0). However, by symmetry, the non-contributor consumes more private
goods than the contributor, cl > ci, and by (1), Sl < Si. This contradicts
Sl > Gj/pj = Si. Hence, the symmetry holds in equilibrium, Si = Sk, and
c1 = ··· = cn.
Next we prove uniqueness. Suppose, on the contrary, there are two sym-
metric equilibria 0 < G0 < G, where κ ≡ G0/G < 1. Since the CES
function is homogenous of degree one and the marginal rates of transfor-
mation are identical in both equilibria, we need gj(G0) = κgj(G) to sat-
isfy Lemma 1. The marginal product of an input j accordingly rewrites
Gj(G0) = κ(ψ−1)/ψGj(G) > Gj(G).
3Since G0 < G, we have c0 > c. By Equation 2 (1), the marginal rate of
the substitution of a representative individual decreases in c, thus S(G0) <
S(G). If G is equilibrium, then S(G) = Gj(G)/pj, and S(G0) < S(G) =
Gj(G)/pj < Gj(G0)/pj. This contradicts the necessary condition for equilib-
rium, S(G0) = Gj(G0)/pj. 
Notice brieﬂy that unlike in Cornes (1993, p. 262), the unique Nash equi-
librium is not invariant to ψ. In the optimum for a representative individual,
S = Gj/pj. To have the Nash equilibrium constant in ψ, we need both S
and Gj to be constant in ψ. However, the marginal product in the equilib-
rium apparently depends on ψ. Consider, for example, a two-input case. For
ψ = 0 (geometric mean), G1 =
p
p1/p2/2. For ψ = 1/2, G1 = (1+p1/p2)/4.
4. Pure complements
The usual reason to disregard pure complements G = min{g1,...,gm} as
uninteresting is that in the classic symmetric case, the Pareto-eﬃcient equi-
librium is unique and the Pareto-dominant overtakes all other equilibria. The
Pareto-inferior equilibria can be justiﬁed only by a coordination failure that
is nevertheless likely to be avoided by pre-play communication. Also, exper-
iments in coordination games point to a low incidence of coordination failure
(Devetag, Ortmann 2007).
With the possibility to pay for all inputs, one should revisit the case of
pure complements. Discrete marginal products, Gj ∈ {0,1}, indicate that
the marginal cost of the public good is not continuous. For instance, to boost
G, one may ﬁrstly need to pay a single missing input, then two inputs and
so on up to all m inputs. This step-wise character may give rise to complex
strategic properties.
We demonstrate the non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria for pure comple-
ments. As a corollary, we classify the equilibria by the strategic eﬀect of
contributions. C-type equilibria exhibit strategic complementarity, and in-
volve the classic possibility of coordination failure. These are also known as
equilibria with a full specialisation (cf. Vicary, Sandler 2002). S-type equi-
libria exhibit strategic substitutability, and do not involve any coordination
failure.
Proposition 2 For pure complements, the set of Nash equilibria is not nec-
essarily a singleton.
4Proof Consider an economy with two people and two inputs, n = m = 2,
prices p1 ≥ p2, and a quasilinear utility, u = c + H(G), where H(·) is an
increasing and concave function, HG(G) ≡ ∂H(G)/∂G, and by the Inada
condition, limG→0+ HG(G) = +∞. It is now useful to deﬁne the optimal
provision depending on the inputs paid on the margin. The marginal beneﬁt
of the public good is ∂u(c,G)/∂G = HG(G); the marginal cost is p1 only if
the extra input 1 must be paid on the margin, p2 only if the extra input 2
must be paid, and p1 + p2 if both inputs must be paid on the margin.
The optimal amounts satisfying the marginal conditions are implicitly
deﬁned as HG(c) = p2, HG(e) = p1 and HG(b) = p1 + p2, where c ≥ e > b
denote paying cheap (c), expensive (e), or both (b) inputs. Now, it is easy
to characterise the full set of Nash equilibria:




2 = b. Here, each individ-
ual who expects payments of another individual is willing to provide
additional contributions exactly up to the level G = b. Hence, contri-
butions are strategic substitutes. Any further increase in G > b would
be suboptimal, since it yields marginal cost p1 +p2 = HG(b) > HG(G).









2) = (G,0,0,G). Here, each individual who expects a suf-
ﬁciently large payment of the other player is willing to matchthe con-
tribution of the other player by paying the missing input only. Hence,
contributions are strategic complements. This holds up to level e, since
for G > e, the player who pays the more expensive good bears the pro-
hibitive marginal cost p1 = HG(e) > HG(G). 
Finally, note that one cannot apply the Pareto-dominance on equilibria of
diﬀerent types; generally, not even on equilibria of the same type. Corollary
1 shows that a ranking is feasible only within subsets of C-type equilibria.
Corollary 1 Not all equilibria can be ranked by Pareto-dominance.
Proof In the example of the proof above, ﬁrst consider Pareto-dominance
in the subsets of equilibria. In S-type equilibria, the total utility is constant
and the payoﬀs diﬀer only in distributional consequences. From the Pareto
perspective, all equilibria are identical. In C-type equilibria, the higher the
provision, the higher the total utility. However, an increase in G associated
with a switch in specialisation may harm the player who switched from a
5cheap to an expensive input. A ranking by Pareto-dominance is feasible only
on subsets where specialisation is ﬁxed (i.e. Player 1 consistently pays only
input 1, or only input 2).
To compare equilibria across types, notice that C-type equilibria provide a
higher total utility. It can be easily inferred that the total utility is maximised
for e ≤ G ≤ c. If specialisation if ﬁxed, then the higher the provision,
the larger the set of S-type equilibria that are Pareto dominated by this C-
type equilibrium. Nevertheless, and most importantly, even the highest C-
type equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-dominated in all S-type equilibria.





where Player 1 is a genuine free rider. To be generous to the highest C-





2) = (0,e,e,0). For Player 2, the highest C-type equilibrium is
clearly better,
u
2(0,e,e,0) = (y − p1e) + H(e) > (y − p1b − p2b) + H(b) = u
2(0,0,b,b).
The reason is that H(e)−H(b) > p1(e−b), i.e. there is always a surplus
over the cost of extra expensive input. However, for Player 1, as long as the
surplus is small, H(e) − H(b) < p2b, then
u
1(0,e,e,0) = (y − p2e) + H(e) < y + H(b) = u
1(0,0,b,b).
This occurs if the surplus over the cost of the extra cheap input is not
suﬃciently large to compensate for the loss of advantage of free riding. In
other words, Player 2 is now harmed by having to cover an extra cheap input
2 at amount b that was previously provided to them for free. 
5. Conclusion
This paper directly extends Cornes (1993) by permitting agents to contribute
to all inputs into a complementary production function of a public good.
It shows that impure complements are eﬀectively strategic substitutes; in
a symmetric simultaneous setup, only pure complements deliver strategic
complementarity. This result contributes to the recent literature identifying
strategic complementarities in a public-good provision (Kessing 2007), and
the literature on non-cooperative transfers with complementary aggregations
(Gregor, Gregorova 2007).
6The introduction of transfers into a purely complementary (weakest-link)
aggregation bring three eﬀects: i) equilibria are of both strategic types, ii)
the minimal provision is deﬁned by a willingness to pay both inputs, hence
coordination failure is partly alleviated, and iii) Pareto-dominance can be
generally applied only within subsets of equilibria, hence standard coordina-
tion failure only partly explains the multiplicity in equilibria.
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